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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 This class action arises from allegations that the 
defendants, who run internet advertising businesses, placed 
tracking cookies on the plaintiffs’ web browsers in 
contravention of their browsers’ cookie blockers and 
defendant Google’s own public statements. At issue in this 
appeal is the District Court’s dismissal of each of the nine 
claims brought by the plaintiffs. As follows, we will affirm in 
part, vacate in part, and remand to the District Court for 
additional proceedings.   
 
I.  Background 
 




 In most users’ experience, webpages appear on 
browsers as integrated collages of text and images. As a 
technical matter, this content is delivered and aggregated 
from multiple independent servers. This includes advertising 
content, which is typically drawn from “third-party” servers 
owned by the advertisers themselves. The defendants in this 
case are internet advertising companies, and this suit concerns 
their practices in serving advertisements to the browsers of 
webpage visitors.   
 
 The delivery of advertising content from third party 
servers to webpage visitors’ browsers is a highly technical 
process involving a series of communications between the 
visitor’s browser, the server of the visited website, and the 
server of the advertising company. In its specifics: 
 
The host website leaves part of its webpage 
blank where the third-party advertisements will 
appear. Upon receiving a “GET” request from a 
user seeking to display a particular webpage, 
the server for that webpage will subsequently 
respond to the browser, instructing the browser 
to send a “GET” request to the third-party 
company charged with serving the 
advertisements for that particular webpage. . . . 
The third-party server responds to the GET 
request by sending the advertisement to the 
user’s browser, which then displays it on the 
user’s device. The entire process occurs within 
milliseconds and the third-party content appears 
to arrive simultaneously with the first-party 
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content so that the user does not discern any 
separate GET requests from the third-parties.1 
 
 As the defendants deliver their advertisements directly 
to users from their own servers, the defendants have the 
capacity to vary how they populate their rented webpage 
space. This capacity permits targeting by which the 
defendants may serve different advertisements to different 
visitors. The general principle is that the more that an 
advertisement is tailored to its audience—sneakers for 
runners, legal pads for lawyers—the greater the 
advertisement’s expected value. Here, the value of 
customization, combined with the capacity for individuated 
advertisement service, impels internet advertisers to surmise 
whatever they can about each particular person requesting 
webpage content.  
 
 As pled in the complaint: 
To inject the most targeted ads possible, and 
therefore charge higher rates to buyers of the ad 
space, these third-party companies . . . compile 
the [i]nternet histories of users. The third-party 
advertising companies use “third-party cookies” 
to accomplish this goal. In the process of 
injecting the advertisements into the first-party 
websites, the third-party advertising companies 
also place third-party cookies on user’s 
computing devices. Since the advertising 
companies place advertisements on multiple 
sites, these cookies allow these companies to 
                                                 
1 Compl. ¶ 41. 
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keep track of and monitor an individual user’s 
web activity over every website on which these 
companies inject ads.2 
These third-party cookies are used by 
advertising companies to help create detailed 
profiles on individuals . . . by recording every 
communication request by that browser to sites 
that are participating in the ad network, 
including all search terms the user has entered. 
The information is sent to the companies and 
associated with unique cookies—that is how the 
tracking takes place. The cookie lets the tracker 
associate the web activity with a unique person 
using a unique browser on a device. Once the 
third-party cookie is placed in the browser, the 
next time the user goes to a website with the 
same [d]efendant’s advertisements, a copy of 
that request can be associated with the unique 
third-party cookie previously placed. Thus the 
tracker can track the behavior of the user . . . .3  
 B. Cookie Blocking, Circumvention, Deceit, and 
Discovery 
 
 Individually tailored webpage advertisements are now 
ubiquitous. But, where cookie-based tracking is concerned, 
leading web browsers have designed built-in features to 
prevent the installation of cookies by third-party servers. The 
                                                 
2 Compl. ¶ 45. 
3 Compl. ¶ 46. 
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complaint calls them “cookie blockers.” The cookie blockers 
of two browsers are at issue in this case. One is Microsoft’s 
Internet Explorer, which featured an “opt-in” cookie blocker 
that a user could elect to activate. The other is Apple’s Safari 
browser, which featured an “opt-out” cookie blocker that was 
activated by default. The complaint notes that the main Apple 
website page dedicated to Safari advertised its opt-out cookie 
blocker as a unique feature, stating that, “to better protect[] 
your privacy[,] Safari accepts cookies only from the websites 
you visit.”4 Likewise, the Safari browser labeled its default 
cookie setting as “Block cookies: From third parties and 
advertisers.”5 
 
 According to the complaint, the Safari and Internet 
Explorer cookie blockers were well-known to industry 
participants, including as to their existence, functionality, and 
purpose. More is alleged about Google in particular. Google’s 
Privacy Policy explained that “most browsers are initially set 
up to accept cookies, but you can reset your browser to refuse 
all cookies or to indicate when a cookie is being sent.”6 
Google provided further assurances about the Safari cookie 
blocker specifically. Google offered a proprietary cookie 
blocker, a so-called “opt-out cookie” that, when downloaded, 
would prevent the installation of tracking cookies. On the 
public webpage Google maintained to describe its opt-out 
cookie, Google assured visitors that “Safari is set by default 
                                                 
4 Compl. ¶ 69. 
5 Compl. ¶ 71. 
6 Compl. ¶ 80. 
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to block all third party cookies. If you have not changed those 
settings, this option essentially accomplishes the same thing 
as setting the opt-out cookie.”7  
 
In February 2012, Stanford graduate student Jonathan 
Mayer published an online report revealing that Google and 
the other defendants had discovered, and were surreptitiously 
exploiting, loopholes in both the Safari cookie blocker and the 
Internet Explorer cookie blocker.8 Safari’s cookie blocker 
turns out to have had a few exceptions, one of which was that 
it permitted third-party cookies if the browser submitted a 
certain form to the third-party. Because advertisement 
delivery does not, in the ordinary course, involve such forms, 
the exception ought not have provided a pathway to installing 
advertiser tracking cookies. But according to Mayer’s report, 
Google used code to command users’ web browsers to 
automatically submit a hidden form to Google when users 
visited websites embedded with Google advertisements. This 
covert form triggered the exception to the cookie blocker, and, 
used widely, enabled the broad placement of cookies on Safari 
browsers notwithstanding that the blocker—as Google 
publicly acknowledged—was designed to prevent just that. 
The other defendants, meanwhile, accomplished similar 
circumventions. As a result, the defendants could—and did—
place third-party cookies on browsers with activated blockers.  
 
                                                 
7 Compl. ¶ 79. 
8 Compl. ¶ 75; Jonathan Mayer, Web Policy Blog, Safari 
Trackers (Feb. 17, 2012), 
http://webpolicy.org/2012/02/17/safari-trackers/. 
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Mayer’s findings were concurrently published in the 
Wall Street Journal9 and drew the attention of the Federal 
Trade Commission and a consortium of state attorneys 
general. The Department of Justice filed suit under the Federal 
Trade Commission’s authorizing statute in the Northern 
District of California, and the action resolved by way of a 
stipulated order providing for a $22.5 million civil penalty.10 
Google further agreed to certain forward-looking conditions 
related to internet privacy, but admitted no past acts or 
wrongdoing.11 Google similarly reached a $17 million 
                                                 
9 Compl. ¶ 74; Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, 
Google’s iPhone Tracking: Web Giant, Others Bypassed 
Apple Browser Settings for Guarding Privacy, Wall Street 
Journal (Feb. 17, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/article_email/SB1000142405297020488
0404577225380456599176. 
10 Compl. ¶¶ 166-68; United States v. Google, Inc., N.D. Cal. 
No. 12-cv-4177, Docs. 1, 30; see also Press Release, Federal 
Trade Commission, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle 
FTC Charges it Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users 
of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser: Privacy Settlement is the 
Largest FTC Penalty Ever for Violation of a Commission 
Order (Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-
settle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented. 
11 Compl. ¶ 169; Google, N.D. Cal. No. 12-cv-4177, Docs. 
30, 32.  
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settlement with 38 state attorneys general, including the 
California Attorney General.12  
C. The Instant Suit 
 
Following Mayer’s report, a series of lawsuits were 
filed in federal district courts around the country. Those 
                                                 
12 See Settlement Agreement between Google, Inc. & the 
Attorneys General of the States of Alabama, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin, as well as 
the District of Columbia, available at 
http://www.ncdoj.gov/News-and-Alerts/News-Releases-and-
Advisories/Related-Information/Google-Safari-Settlement-
Agreement.aspx; see also Claire Cain Miller, Google to Pay 
$17 Million to Settle Privacy Case, N.Y. Times (Nov. 18, 
2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/19/technology/google-to-
pay-17-million-to-settle-privacy-case.html. The settlement 
with the state attorneys general post-dated the District Court’s 
dismissal order, and thus the filing of the complaint. Because 
the fact of this settlement is well-documented and officially 
recognized by the many governmental parties to it, and 
because the public policy implications of imposing liability 
on defendant Google are highly relevant to the disposition of 
two of the plaintiffs’ claims, we will take judicial notice of 
Google’s settlement with the state attorneys general.  
 12 
lawsuits were consolidated by the Multi-District Litigation 
panel and assigned to Judge Sue Robinson of the District of 
Delaware. This appeal is from the District Court’s dismissal 
of that consolidated case.  
 
The consolidated case was presented to the District 
Court as a putative class action, and four named plaintiffs—
our appellants here—filed a consolidated class action 
complaint. The putative class consists of: 
 
all persons in the United States of America who 
used the Apple Safari or Microsoft Internet 
Explorer web browsers and who visited a 
website from which doubleclick.net (Google’s 
advertising serving service), PointRoll, Vibrant 
Media, Media Innovation Group, or WPP 
cookies were deployed as part of a scheme to 
circumvent the users’ browsers’ settings to 
block such cookies and which were thereby 
used to enable tracking of the class members[’] 
[i]nternet communications without consent.13 
 
 The complaint asserts three federal law claims against 
all defendants. Count I claims violation of the federal Wiretap 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. Count II claims violation of the 
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C § 2701. And Count III 
claims violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1030.   
 
                                                 
13 Compl. ¶ 191.  
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 The complaint also asserts six California state law 
claims against Google only. Count IV claims violation of the 
privacy right conferred by the California Constitution. Count 
V claims intrusion upon seclusion under California tort law. 
Count VI claims violation of the Unfair Competition Law, 
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Count VII claims violation 
of the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and 
Fraud Act, Cal. Penal Code § 502. Count VIII claims 
violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal 
Code § 630 et seq. And Count IX claims violation of the 
California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code 
§ 1750 et seq.   
 
 The defendants moved to dismiss the entire complaint 
for lack of Article III standing and for failure to state any 
claim. Without definitively resolving the standing challenge, 
the District Court agreed with the defendants that the 
allegations in the complaint did not give rise to any action, 
and on that basis dismissed the complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6).14 On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge the dismissal of 
each of their nine claims, and the defendants renew their 
contention that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing.  
 
II. Injury in Fact 
 
 Before we reach the merits, we address the defendants’ 
argument that the plaintiffs lack standing. “[T]he question of 
standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court 
                                                 
14 In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy 
Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 434 (D. Del. 2013). 
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decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”15 A 
core requirement of standing is that the plaintiff have suffered 
an injury in fact. The defendants contend that the plaintiffs 
fail to demonstrate injury in fact because they make 
insufficient allegations of pecuniary harm.  
 For purposes of injury in fact, the defendants’ 
emphasis on economic loss is misplaced. In assessing injury 
in fact, we look for an “invasion . . . which is (a) concrete and 
particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.”16 Though the “injury must affect the plaintiff in 
a personal and individual way,”17 this standard does not 
demand that a plaintiff suffer any particular type of harm to 
have standing. Consequently, and contrary to the contentions 
of the defendants, a plaintiff need not show actual monetary 
loss for purposes of injury in fact. Rather, “the actual or 
threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by 
virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which 
creates standing.”18 Sure enough, the Supreme Court itself 
                                                 
15 Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 
296 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If 
[the] plaintiffs do not possess Article III standing, both the 
District Court and this Court lack subject matter jurisdiction 
to address the merits of [the] plaintiffs’ case.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
16 Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 390 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 
(1992)). 
17 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1. 
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has permitted a plaintiff to bring suit for violations of federal 
privacy law absent any indication of pecuniary harm.19  
 The plaintiffs here base their claims on highly specific 
allegations that the defendants, in the course of serving 
advertisements to their personal web browsers, implanted 
tracking cookies on their personal computers. Irrespective of 
whether these allegations state a claim, the events that the 
complaint describes are concrete, particularized, and actual as 
to the plaintiffs. To the extent that the defendants believe that 
the alleged conduct implicates interests that are not legally 
protected, this is an issue of the merits rather than of standing.  
 The plaintiffs show injury in fact, and we have 
jurisdiction to address the merits of their claims.20  
                                                                                                             
18 Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. 
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (“[E]nvironmental 
plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that 
they use the affected area and are persons for whom the 
aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened 
by the challenged activity.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
19 See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 641 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“Doe has standing to sue, the Court agrees, based 
on ‘allegations that he was “torn . . . all to pieces” and 
“greatly concerned and worried” because of the disclosure of 
his Social Security number and its potentially “devastating” 
consequences.’”). 
20 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the 
plaintiffs’ federal law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It had 
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III. Federal Claims Against All Defendants 
 
 We first address the three federal law claims brought 
against all defendants. For the following reasons, we will 
vacate the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim but 
affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims under the Stored 
Communications Act and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.  
 
 A. The Federal Wiretap Act 
 
 The federal Wiretap Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
2510 et seq. A plaintiff pleads a prima facie case under the 
Act by showing that the defendant “(1) intentionally (2) 
intercepted, endeavored to intercept or procured another 
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept (3) the contents of 
(4) an electronic communication, (5) using a device.”21 Of 
                                                                                                             
subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law claims 
for two independent reasons: supplemental jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1367, and diversity jurisdiction under the Class 
Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). We have 
jurisdiction over the District Court’s final dismissal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  
21 In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st 
Cir. 2003) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)); see also §§ 
2510(4) (providing that “‘intercept’ means the aural or other 
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral 
communication through the use of any electronic, 
mechanical, or other device”), 2520 (providing a private right 
of action)).   
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several statutory exceptions, one is the exception of 
§ 2511(2)(d). Section 2511(2)(d) provides that, ordinarily, no 
cause of action will lie against a private person “where such 
person is a party to the communication or where one of the 





  1. Acquisition of “Content” 
 
 The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ Wiretap 
Act claim on the basis that the defendants’ alleged conduct 
did not involve the acquisition of communications “content.” 
While the plaintiffs allege that the defendants acquired and 
tracked the URLs they visited, the Act defines “contents” as 
“any information concerning the substance, purport, or 
meaning of th[e] communication [at issue].”23 The District 
Court held that, “[a]s described by their name, ‘Universal 
Resource Locators,’ . . . . a URL is a location identifier and 
does not ‘concern [ ] the substance, purport, or meaning’ of 
an electronic communication.’”24 
                                                 
22 The exception does not apply if “such communication is 
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or 
tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States or of any State.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). 
23 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). 
24 In re: Google, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (final alteration in 
original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8)). 
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 In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court made clear 
the important difference between extrinsic information used 
to route a communication and the communicated content 
itself.25 In Smith, the Supreme Court found no Fourth 
Amendment violation from the government’s warrantless use 
of a pen register.26 Distinguishing its holding in Katz v. 
United States27 that warrantless wiretapping violated the 
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court explained that “a pen 
register differs significantly from the listening device 
employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the 
contents of communications.”28 Rather, the Court explained, 
pen registers “disclose only the telephone numbers that have 
been dialed—a means of establishing communication. Neither 
the purport of any communication between the caller and the 
recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was 
even completed is disclosed by pen registers.”29  
 
 Smith’s differentiation between the “means of 
establishing communication” and the “purport of a[] 
communication”30 looms large in federal surveillance law. 
                                                 
25 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  
26 Id. at 745-46. 
27 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
28 Id. at 741 (emphasis in original).  
29 Id. (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 
159, 167 (1977)). 
30 Id. 
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Whereas the Wiretap Act governs the interception of 
communications “content[],”31 the separate federal Pen 
Register Act governs the acquisition of non-content “dialing, 
routing, addressing, [or] signaling information.”32 As the 
House of Representatives noted in its Report regarding the 
enactment of the PATRIOT Act, “the statutorily prescribed 
line between a communication’s contents and non-content 
information[] [is] a line identical to the constitutional 
distinction drawn by the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith v. 
Maryland.”33 
 
 Since Smith, location identifiers have classically been 
associated with non-content “means of establishing 
communication.”34 Nevertheless, the District Court’s 
                                                 
31 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4); see also id. § 2511(1)(a). 
32 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121(c), 3127(3)-(4). Where surveillance by 
law enforcement is concerned, “[t]he difference in the 
standards for court approval of content-capturing wiretaps 
and non-content-capturing pen registers is dramatic—content 
information is protected by a ‘super-warrant,’ non-content 
information by a rubber stamp.” Matthew J. Tokson, The 
Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 2105, 2120 (2009).  
33 Report of the House of Representatives Judiciary 
Committee, H. Rep. No. 107-236, at 53, available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-107hrpt236/pdf/CRPT-
107hrpt236-pt1.pdf. 
34 Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (quoting New York Tel. Co., 434 
U.S. at 167). 
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categorical assessment that location identifiers never 
“concern[] the substance, purport, or meaning” of a 
communication misses the mark.35 Often, a location identifier 
serves no routing function, but instead comprises part of a 
communication’s substance.36 As a leading treatise on 
criminal procedure explains: 
[T]he line between content and non-content 
information is inherently relative. If A sends a 
letter to B, asking him to deliver a package to C 
at a particular address, the contents of that letter 
are contents from A to B but mere non-content 
addressing information with respect to the 
delivery of the package to C. In the case of e-
mail, for example, a list of e-mail addresses sent 
as an attachment to an e-mail communication 
from one person to another are contents rather 
than addressing information. In short, whether 
an e-mail address is content or non-content 
information depends entirely on the 
circumstances.37 
In essence, addresses, phone numbers, and URLs may be 
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information, but 
only when they are performing such a function. If an address, 
                                                 
35 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). 
36 See generally Orin Kerr, Websurfing and the Wiretap Act, 
Wash. Post. (June 4, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/06/04/websurfing-and-the-wiretap-act/.  
37 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., 2 Crim. Proc. § 4.4(d) (3d ed.). 
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phone number, or URL is instead part of the substantive 
information conveyed to the recipient, then by definition it is 
“content.”  
 
 The different ways that an address can be used means, 
as Professor Orin Kerr puts it, that “the line between contents 
and metadata is not abstract but contextual with respect to 
each communication.”38 Thus, there is no general answer to 
the question of whether locational information is content. 
Rather, a “content” inquiry is a case-specific one turning on 
the role the location identifier played in the “intercepted” 
communication.  
 
 Here, the complaint does not make clear whether the 
tracked URLs were acquired by the defendants from 
communications in which those URLs played a routing 
function. This is not, however, fatal to the plaintiffs’ claim.  
 
 In a declassified opinion analyzing whether there was 
statutory authority for a National Security Agency 
surveillance program, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court observed that the government possessed trap and trace 
authority over “dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling 
information . . . provided, however, that such information 
shall not include the contents of any information.”39 The 
                                                 
38 Kerr, Websurfing and the Wiretap Act.  
39 [Redacted], No. PR/TT [Redacted] (FISA Ct. 2010), 
available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%2
02.pdf at 26 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4)). 
 22 
Surveillance Court read this to mean that, for purposes of 
federal surveillance law, information may well serve both a 
routing function and a content function. Noting the breadth of 
the statutory descriptions of routing information and 
“content,” the Surveillance Court concluded that routing 
information and “content” are not mutually exclusive 
categories, but rather ones that Congress expressly 
contemplated to be occasionally coextensive.40 Proceeding to 
identify exemplary areas where routing information and 
“content” overlap, the Surveillance Court pointed, “in 
particular,” to URL queries that involve reproduction of a 
search phrase entered by a user into a search engine.41 
Quoting the District of Massachusetts, the Surveillance Court 
explained that, “if a user runs a search using an [i]nternet 
search engine, the ‘search phrase would appear in the URL 
after the first forward slash’ as part of the addressing 
information, but would also reveal contents, i.e., the 
‘“substance” and “meaning” of the communication . . . that 
the user is conducting a search for information on a particular 
topic.’”42 For an example from another context, the court 
pointed to post-cut-through digits in the phone context “as 
                                                 
40 Id. at 31. 
41 Id. at 32. 
42 Id. at 32 (final alteration in original) (quoting In re 
Application of the U.S., 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 49 (D. Mass. 
2005)).  
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dialing information, some of which also constitutes 
contents.”43  
 
 The decision of the Surveillance Court is instructive in 
several ways relevant to our analysis here. The first of these is 
that, to the extent that the statutory definitions and conceptual 
categories of content and routing information overlap, 
Congress expressly contemplated the possibility of such an 
overlap. For the reasons stated by the Surveillance Court, we 
are persuaded that, under the surveillance laws, “dialing, 
routing, addressing, and signaling information” may also be 
“content.”  
 
 Second, the Surveillance Court takes the position that 
queried URLs can be content as well as routing information, 
for instance in the case of URLs that reproduce search engine 
inquiries. Though some district courts have held that a URL 
is never content, the Surveillance Court decision is part of a 
growing chorus that some, if not most, queried URLs do 
contain content. In In re Zynga Privacy Litigation, the Ninth 
Circuit took the position that queried URLs are content if, but 
only if, they reproduce words from a search engine query.44 
                                                 
43 Id. at 33. As the Southern District of Texas has explained, 
“‘[p]ost-cut-through dialed digits’ are any numbers dialed 
from a telephone after the call is initially setup or ‘cut-
through.’” In re Application of the U.S., 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 
818 (S.D. Tex. 2006). “Sometimes these digits transmit real 
information, such as bank account numbers, Social Security 
numbers, prescription numbers, and the like.” Id. 
44 750 F.3d 1098, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A] user’s 
request to a search engine for specific information could 
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In United States v. Forrester, meanwhile, a different panel of 
the Ninth Circuit noted that warrantless capture of URLs 
generally “might be more constitutionally problematic” than 
warrantless capture of IP addresses.45 The Forrester court 
explained that “[a] URL, unlike an IP address, identifies the 
particular document within a website that a person views and 
thus reveals much more information about the person’s 
[i]nternet activity.”46 Akin to Forrester is the stance taken by 
the House Judiciary Committee in its PATRIOT Act report, 
which stated that a pen register order “could not be used to 
collect information other than ‘dialing, routing, addressing, 
and signaling’ information, such as the portion of a URL 
(Uniform Resource Locator) specifying Web search terms or 
                                                                                                             
constitute a communication such that divulging a URL 
containing that search term to a third party could amount to 
disclosure of the contents of a communication. But the 
referrer header information at issue here includes only basic 
identification and address information, not a search term or 
similar communication made by the user, and therefore does 
not constitute the contents of a communication.”). 
45 512 F.3d 500, 510 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008). An “IP address” is 
“[t]he 10-digit identification tag used by computers to locate 
specific websites.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) 
(“Internet-protocol address”). 
46 512 F.3d at 510 n.6; see also Tokson, The 
Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. at 2136 (“[S]tandard URLs . . . reveal every bit 
as much content as do URLs containing search terms.”). 
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the name of a requested file or article.”47 Though none of 
these authorities offer detailed reasoning on why they draw 
the “content” line where they do, what they have in common 
is that they assess whether a URL involves “contents” based 
on how much information would be revealed by disclosure of 
the URL.  
 
 Third, the Surveillance Court’s example of post-cut-
through digits in the telephone context—i.e. numbers dialed 
from a telephone after a call is already setup or “cut-
through”—hints at a different reason why queried URLs 
might be considered content. A number of courts apart from 
the Surveillance Court—most prominently the D.C. Circuit—
have found such digits to comprise communications content 
beyond the permissible scope of a pen register.48 URL queries 
                                                 
47 See H. Rep. No. 107-36, at 53. 
48 See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 227 F.3d 450, 462 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000) (“Post-cut-through dialed digits can . . . represent 
call content. For example, subjects calling automated banking 
services enter account numbers. When calling voicemail 
systems, they enter passwords. When calling pagers, they dial 
digits that convey actual messages. And when calling 
pharmacies to renew prescriptions, they enter prescription 
numbers.”); In re Applications of the U.S., 515 F. Supp. 2d 
325, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]he “Government’s request for 
access to all post-cut-through dialed digits is not clearly 
authorized by the Pen/Trap Statute, and . . . granting such a 
request would violate the Fourth Amendment . . . .”); In re 
Application of the U.S., 441 F. Supp. 2d at 827 (“Post-cut-
through dialed digits . . . are not available to law enforcement 
under the Pen/Trap Statute.”). 
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bear functional analogues to this process, in that different 
portions of a queried URL may serve to convey different 
messages to different audiences. For instance, the domain 
name portion of the URL—everything before the “.com”—
instructs a centralized web server to direct the user to a 
particular website, but post-domain name portions of the 
URL are designed to communicate to the visited website 
which webpage content to send the user.49 
 As stated above, we agree with the Surveillance Court 
that routing information and content are not mutually 
exclusive categories. And between the information revealed 
by highly detailed URLs and their functional parallels to post-
cut-through digits, we are persuaded that—at a minimum—
some queried URLs qualify as content.50 Indeed, the 
                                                 
49 See generally Jonathan Mayer, Web Browsing (Under the 
Pen Register Act and Wiretap Act), (Nov. 28, 2014). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7vFha-af7GE  
50 We need not make a global determination as to what is 
content, and why, in the context of queried URLs. Lack of 
consensus, the complexity and rapid pace of change 
associated with the delivery of modern communications, and 
the facileness of direct analogy to mail and telephone cases 
counsel the utmost care in considering what is, and what is 
not, “content” in the context of web queries. Indeed, when it 
comes to differentiating content from non-content, Professor 
Kerr describes queried URLs as “the most difficult and 
discussed case.” Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth 
Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1005, 1030 n. 93 (2010); see also Orin S. Kerr, Internet 
Surveillance Law after the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother 
that Isn’t, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 607, 644-48 (2003); cf. Tokson, 
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defendants’ counsel acknowledged as much at argument.51 
Because the complaint pleads a broad scheme in which the 
defendants generally acquired and tracked the plaintiffs’ 
internet usage, we are satisfied that this scheme, if it operated 
as alleged, involved the collection of at least some “content” 
within the meaning of the Wiretap Act.52   
                                                                                                             
The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. at 2136 (“Perhaps because it is so intuitive that 
search terms in a URL should be considered content, the 
treatment of content-revealing communications data is 
undertheorized in computer surveillance scholarship.”). 
51 Oral Arg. Tr. at 44 (“We acknowledge that there may be 
URLs that could constitute content.”). 
52 Because the URL information acquired and tracked by the 
defendants is “content” for purposes of the plaintiffs’ Wiretap 
Act claim, we need not consider whether the defendants 
acquired and/or tracked other “content” from the electronic 
transmissions at issue. Our understanding of the factual 
position of the defendants is that their cookies operate by 
adding a unique sequence of letters and/or numbers to any 
GET request transmitted from the user browser hosting the 
cookie to the advertiser server that set the cookie. See Oral 
Arg. Tr. at 25 (“The cookie doesn’t acquire anything. . . . The 
cookie doesn’t look for anything. It just sits on the browser 
and gets sent along with information that would otherwise be 
sent.”); id. at 26 (“Maybe it’s sort of like a bookmark. 
Information gets sent anyway every day, all the time. And 
then a cookie is placed. And thereafter the same information 
is sent, except that the cookie is there, too. It’s unique. It’s not 
personally identifying. It has nothing to do with the actual 
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  2. Section 2511(2)(d)  
 
  According to the defendants, even if we find that the 
plaintiffs adequately plead the acquisition of “content,” we 
may affirm nevertheless under § 2511(2)(d). Section 
2511(2)(d) sets forth that “[i]t shall not be unlawful . . . for a 
person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, 
or electronic communication where such person is a party to 
the communication . . . unless such communication is 
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or 
tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States or of any State.” The defendants contend that 
they were the intended recipients of—and thus “parties” to—
any electronic transmissions that they acquired and tracked, 
and that, as they committed no secondary criminal or tortious 
act, their conduct cannot have been unlawful under the 
statute.   
   a. How the Information at Issue 
Was Acquired 
 
 Before we can assess whether the defendants were 
“parties” to the electronic transmissions at issue, we must first 
identify what, exactly, are the transmissions at issue.  
 
 In the portion of the complaint devoted to the 
plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim, the complaint states that “the 
[d]efendants’ third-party web tracking permitted them to 
                                                                                                             
information that’s being sent at that time.”). This is consistent 
with our understanding of the allegations of the plaintiffs, as 
discussed in detail below.  
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record information that [c]lass [m]embers exchanged with 
first-party websites . . . which [the d]efendants intercepted 
while not a party to those communications (hence third-party 
tracking)[.]”53 It continues to plead that “the defendants’ 
third-party tracking intercepted the class members’ 
communications while they were in transit from the class 
members’ computing devices to the web servers of the first-
party websites the class members used their browsers to 
visit.”54  
 The highly specific allegations contained in the body 
of the complaint, however, give no credence to the 
complaint’s later allegations that the defendants acquired their 
internet history information from transmissions between the 
plaintiffs’ browsers and first-party websites. With respect to 
the mechanics of the defendants’ acquisition of web browsing 
information, the interior of the complaint says that, “[u]pon 
receiving a []GET[] request from a user seeking to display a 
particular webpage, the server for that webpage will 
subsequently respond to the browser, instructing the browser 
to send a []GET[] request to the third-party company charged 
with serving the advertisements for that particular 
webpage.”55 As to Google specifically, the complaint likewise 
pleads that “the server hosting the publisher’s webpage . . . 
instructs the user’s web browser to send a GET request to 
Google to display the relevant advertising information for the 
                                                 
53 Compl. ¶ 206. 
54 Compl. ¶ 208. 
55 Compl. ¶ 41. 
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space on the page for which Google has agreed to sell display 
advertisements.”56 
 
 If users’ browsers directly communicate with the 
defendants about the webpages they are visiting—as the 
complaint pleads with particularity—then there is no need for 
the defendants to acquire that information from transmissions 
to which they are not a party. After all, the defendants would 
have the information at issue anyway. Underscoring that there 
are direct transmissions between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants, the complaint notes that the defendants place 
cookies on web browsers “in the process of injecting the 
advertisements,”57 which are “serve[d] . . . directly from the 
third-party company’s servers rather than going through the 
individual website’s server.”58  
 
 The complaint’s descriptions of how tracking is 
accomplished, meanwhile, further supports that the 
information was captured from the plaintiffs’ GET requests to 
the defendants. According to the complaint:  
The information is sent to the companies and 
associated with unique cookies -- that is how 
the tracking takes place. The cookie lets the 
tracker associate the web activity with a unique 
person using a unique browser on a device. 
Once the third-party cookie is placed in the 
                                                 
56 Compl. ¶ 86. 
57 Compl. ¶ 45. 
58 Compl. ¶ 41. 
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browser, the next time the user goes to a 
webpage with the same [d]efendant’s 
advertisements, a copy of that request can be 
associated with the unique third-party cookie 
previously placed. Thus the tracker can track 
the behavior of the user[.]”59  
 
If the information at issue is sent to the defendants in the 
ordinary course, then this description of the cookies makes 
sense. This is because in such a scenario the defendants need 
only associate information to track it, which can be 
successfully accomplished by affixing an identifier to that 
information. This is precisely how the complaint describes the 
defendants’ cookies’ function. With respect to Google, the 
complaint pleads installation of Google’s “id” cookie, “which 
is a unique and consistent identifier given to each user by 
Google for its use in tracking persons across the entire 
spectrum of websites on which Google places . . . cookies.”60  
Google allegedly uses this cookie to “identif[y] users,” such 
that “the placement of the third-party cookies, placed by 
circumventing Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ privacy 
settings, allows this identification to take place.”61 Likewise, 
as to two of the other defendants, the complaint says that 
“[t]he spokesman [for Vibrant] admitted Vibrant used the 
                                                 
59 Compl. ¶ 46. 
60 Compl. ¶ 95. 
61 Compl. ¶ 96. 
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trick ‘for unique user identification,’”62 and that “Media’s ‘id’ 
cookie is just that—an ‘ID’ or ‘identification’ cookie.”63   
 
 Just as the operative allegations in the complaint tend 
to support the inference that the cookies enabled the 
defendants to identify, and thus associate, information that the 
plaintiffs sent directly to them in the ordinary course, the 
operative allegations tend to negate any inference to the 
contrary. This is because, if the information at issue was not 
sent to the defendants in the ordinary course, mere 
identification cookies would not be sufficient for the 
defendants’ scheme. To accomplish their tracking in that 
instance, the defendants would have needed not an 
associative device, but one capable of capturing 
communications sent by the plaintiffs and intended for first-
party websites, and then transmitting them to the 
defendants.64 There is no pleading of any such device, nor is 
                                                 
62 Compl. ¶ 151 
63 Compl. ¶ 156 
64 Cf. Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 22 (“[Pharmatrak’s code] 
automatically duplicated part of the communication between 
a user and a pharmaceutical client and sent this information to 
a third party (Pharmatrak).”); In re iPhone Application Litig., 
844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“The intended 
communication is between the users’ iPhone and the Wi-fi 
and cell phone towers, and Plaintiffs appear to allege that 
Apple designed its operating system to intercept that 
communication and transmit the information to Apple’s 
servers.”). 
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that function the ordinary function of a tracking cookie. As 
stated above, in discussing the function of the defendants’ 
cookies, the complaint describes them as having an 
associative function only.65  
 
 In view of our common sense reading of the operative 
allegations of the complaint, we note the factual position that 
the defendants advanced at argument: “The cookie doesn’t 
acquire anything . . . The cookie doesn’t look for anything. It 
just sits on the browser and gets sent along with information 
that would otherwise be sent.”66 The information at issue 
would be sent anyway because “the user’s web browser 
send[s] a GET request to Google to display the relevant 
advertising information for the space on the page for which 
Google has agreed to sell display advertisements.”67 We note 
also that, at argument, the plaintiffs’ counsel was directly 
asked on six separate occasions to clarify what transmissions 
they believed were improperly acquired and/or how the 
defendants’ cookies functioned.68 The plaintiffs’ counsel did 
not provide a direct response on any of these occasions. 
  
 At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage  “we accept the pleader’s 
description of what happened to him or her along with any 
                                                 
65 Compl. ¶¶ 46, 95, 96, 151, 156. 
66 Oral Arg. Tr. at 25. 
67 Compl. ¶ 86. 
68 Oral Arg. Tr. at 9-10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. 
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conclusions that can reasonably be drawn therefrom.”69 This 
standard permits the dismissal of a complaint “when [the] 
defendant’s plausible alternative explanation is so convincing 
that plaintiff’s explanation is im plausible.”70 Here, the 
operative allegations of the complaint support only the 
conclusion that the defendants acquired the plaintiffs’ internet 
history information by way of GET requests that the plaintiffs 
sent directly to the defendants, and that the defendants 
deployed identifier cookies to make the information received 
from GET requests associable and thus trackable. And though 
the portion of the complaint pertaining to the Wiretap Act 
contains statements to the contrary, we need not give legal 
effect to “conclusory allegations” that are contradicted by the 
pleader’s actual description of what happened.71 
 
 In short, our understanding of the plaintiffs’ 
allegations is that the defendants acquired the plaintiffs’ 
internet history information when, in the course of requesting 
webpage advertising content at the direction of the visited 
website, the plaintiffs’ browsers sent that information directly 
to the defendants’ servers.  
 
                                                 
69 5B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1357 (3d ed.) (“Motions to 
Dismiss—Practice Under Rule 12(b)(6)”). 
70 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 
(2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007)). 
71 5B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1357.  
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   b. Application of § 2511(2)(d) 
 
 Because the defendants were the intended recipients of 
the transmissions at issue—i.e. GET requests that the 
plaintiffs’ browsers sent directly to the defendants’ servers—
we agree that § 2511(2)(d) means the defendants have done 
nothing unlawful under the Wiretap Act. Tautologically, a 
communication will always consist of at least two parties: the 
speaker and/or sender, and at least one intended recipient. As 
the intended recipient of a communication is necessarily one 
of its parties, and the defendants were the intended recipients 
of the GET requests they acquired here, the defendants were 
parties to the transmissions at issue in this case. And under 
§ 2511(2)(d), it is not unlawful for a private person “to 
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where 
such person is a party to the communication.”72 
 
 In their reply brief, the plaintiffs raise three objections 
in response to the argument that their Wiretap Act claim must 
fail because the defendants were the intended recipients of the 
relevant communications. None are persuasive. 
 
 First, the plaintiffs argue that we should not consider 
the defendants’ argument because the issue was not addressed 
by the District Court and because the defendants failed to 
raise the issue in the form of a cross-appeal. This is 
inapposite, for even if the defendants had never raised the 
issue at all, whether the plaintiffs have stated a claim is a 
matter of law to be determined from the face of their 
complaint. As always, we may affirm a district court’s 
                                                 
72 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).  
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judgment on grounds other than those considered by the 
district court itself.73  
 
 Second, the plaintiffs argue that the party exception 
should not apply for equitable reasons, in that the transmitted 
GET requests included cookie information that the 
communications included only because of the defendants’ 
surreptitious circumvention of the cookie blockers. The point 
here is that, though the plaintiffs sent the GET requests to the 
defendants voluntarily, they were induced to do so by deceit. 
Though we are no doubt troubled by the various deceits 
alleged in the complaint, we do not agree that a deceit upon 
the sender affects the presumptive non-liability of parties 
under § 2511(2)(d). “In the context of the statute, a party to 
the conversation is one who takes part in the conversation.”74 
There is no statutory language indicating this excludes 
intended recipients who procured their entrance to a 
conversation through a fraud in the inducement, such as, here, 
                                                 
73 See Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 
4746391, at *8 (3d Cir. Aug. 12, 2015). 
74 Caro v. Weintraub, 618 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2010) United 
States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1964) 
(“[I]mpersonation of the intended receiver is not an 
interception within the meaning of the statute.”); Clemons v. 
Waller, 82 Fed. App’x 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2003) (“By citing 
Pasha, Congress strongly intimated that one who 
impersonates the intended receiver of a communication may 
still be a party to that communication for the purposes of the 
federal wiretap statute and that such conduct is not proscribed 
by the statute.”). 
 37 
by deceiving the plaintiffs’ browsers into thinking the cookie-
setting entity was a first-party website.  
 
 It is not unimaginable that the Wiretap Act would give 
legal effect to the fraudulent participation of a party to a 
conversation.75 It is, after all, a wiretapping statute.76 Indeed, 
it appears the absence of an equitable exception to § 
2511(2)(d) is no accident. In United States v. Pasha, the 
Seventh Circuit held that a police officer who impersonated 
the intended recipient of a phone call did not violate the 
Wiretap Act.77 And, as the Sixth Circuit has explained: 
When amending the federal [W]iretap [A]ct in 
1968 to its current state, Congress specifically 
mentioned Pasha in its discussions of the “party 
to the communication” provision. In discussing 
§ 2511(2)(c), which is in pari materia with § 
2511(2)(d) and differs from that provision only 
in that § 2511(2)(c) applies to persons acting 
under color of law, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee stated: 
 
                                                 
75 Cf. Desnick v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 
1352 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The law’s willingness to give effect to 
consent procured by fraud is not limited to the tort of 
trespass.”). 
76 See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
“wiretapping” as “electronic or mechanical eavesdropping”). 
77 333 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964).  
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Paragraph 2(c) provides that it 
shall not be unlawful for a party 
to any wire or oral 
communication . . . to intercept 
such communication. It largely 
reflects existing law. Where one 
of the parties consents, it is not 
unlawful. . . . “[P]arty” would 
mean the person actually 
participating in the 
communication. (United States v. 
Pasha, 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 
1964)).78 
 
We agree with the Sixth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit that, 
“[b]y citing Pasha, Congress strongly intimated that one who 
impersonates the intended receiver of a communication may 
still be a party to that communication for the purposes of the 
federal wiretap statute and that such conduct is not proscribed 
by the statute.”79 Likewise, we conclude it was by design that 
there is no statutory language by which the defendants’ 
various alleged deceits would vitiate their claims to be parties 
                                                 
78 Clemons v. Waller, 82 Fed. App’x 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(quoting S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 93-94 (1968)); see also 
United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 
1979) (“It is clear from this passage that Congress intended to 
reaffirm the result in Pasha and make admissible 
communications to which a police officer is a party.”). 
79 Clemons, 82 Fed. App’x at 442; accord Campagnuolo, 592 
F.2d at 863.  
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to the relevant communications. The Wiretap Act is a 
wiretapping statute, and just because a scenario sounds in 
fraud or deceit does not mean it sounds in wiretapping.80  
                                                 
80 As § 2511(2)(d) contemplates that a “party” to a 
communication can “intercept” it, we are led to believe that 
the present version of the Wiretap Act gives “intercept” a 
broader connotation than “the ordinary meaning of ‘intercept’ 
. . . [which] is ‘to stop, seize, or interrupt in progress or 
course before arrival.’” See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 
302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Webster’s Ninth 
New Collegiate Dictionary 630 (1985)); see also Goldman v. 
United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942) (“The natural 
meaning of the term ‘intercept’ . . . indicates the taking or 
seizure by the way or before arrival at the destined place.”), 
overruled on other grounds by Katz, 389 U.S. 347; Black’s 
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “intercept” as “to 
covertly receive or listen to (a communication)”). We will 
not, therefore, adopt the defendants’ other alternative 
argument, which is that the plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim 
should fail for want of an “interception.” If the plaintiffs’ 
claims had been brought under the Wiretap Act as it existed 
when Pasha was decided, however, the plaintiffs would likely 
fail to show an “interception” for the same reason that, today, 
they fail to show that the defendants were not parties to the 
relevant communications within the meaning of § 2511(2)(d). 
See Pasha, 333 F.2d at 198 (“Interception connotes a 
situation in which by surreptitious means a third party 
overhears a telephone conversation between two persons. We 
believe that impersonation of the intended receiver is not an 
interception within the meaning of the statute.”). 
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 Finally, the plaintiffs argue that § 2511(2)(d) should 
not apply because the defendants’ acquisition of the 
communications at issue was tortious under California law. 
The basis for this argument is that § 2511(2)(d) is 
inapplicable when the communication at issue is “intercepted 
for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in 
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of 
any State.” But the plaintiffs point to no legal authority 
providing that the exception to § 2511(2)(d) is triggered 
when, as here, the tortious conduct is the alleged wiretapping 
itself. By contrast, all authority of which we are aware 
indicates that the criminal or tortious acts contemplated by § 
2511(2)(d) are acts secondary to the acquisition of the 
communication involving tortious or criminal use of the 
interception’s fruits.81  
                                                 
81 See Caro v. Weintraub, 618 F.3d 94, 98, 100 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“[T]he defendant must have the intent to use the illicit 
recording to commit a tort or crime beyond the act of 
recording itself. . . . Intent may not be inferred simply by 
demonstrating that the intentional act of recording itself 
constituted a tort. A simultaneous tort arising from the act of 
recording itself is insufficient.”); Sussman v. Am. Broad. 
Companies, Inc., 186 F.3d 1200, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(“Under section 2511, the focus is not upon whether the 
interception itself violated another law; it is upon whether the 
purpose for the interception—its intended use—was criminal 
or tortious. . . .  Where the purpose is not illegal or tortious, 
but the means are, the victims must seek redress elsewhere.”); 
Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1353 (“[T]here is no suggestion that the 
defendants sent the testers into the Wisconsin and Illinois 
offices for the purpose of defaming the plaintiffs by charging 
tampering with the glare machine.”). 
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 As the Second Circuit explained in Caro v. Weintraub, 
“to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead 
sufficient facts to support an inference that the offender 
intercepted the communication for the purpose of a tortious or 
criminal act that is independent of the intentional act of 
recording.”82 And though the plaintiffs may well plead facts 
that constitute violations of California laws related to 
intrusion upon seclusion, for purposes of the exception to § 
2511(2)(d), “[i]nvasion of privacy through intrusion upon 
seclusion presents a problem . . . —it is a tort that occurs 
through the act of interception itself.”83 As the plaintiffs plead 
no tortious or criminal use of the acquired internet histories, § 
2511(2)(d) is not inapplicable on the basis of the criminal-
tortious purpose exception. 
 
 Based on the facts alleged in the pleadings, the 
defendants were parties to any communications that they 
acquired, such that their conduct is within the § 2511(2)(d) 
exception.84 We will accordingly affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim.  
 
 B. The Stored Communications Act 
 
 We next address the plaintiffs’ claim for violation of 
the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701. Enacted 
in 1986, the Stored Communications Act was born from 
congressional recognition that neither existing federal statutes 
                                                 
82 Caro, 618 F.3d at 100 (emphasis added).  
83 Id. at 101. 
84 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). 
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nor the Fourth Amendment protected against potential 
intrusions on individual privacy arising from illicit access to 
“stored communications in remote computing operations and 
large data banks that stored e-mails.”85 
 
 To state a claim under the Stored Communications 
Act, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “(1) 
intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through 
which an electronic communication service is provided; or (2) 
intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; 
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a 
wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic 
storage in such system.”86 
 
 The District Court dismissed this claim on the basis of 
the Act’s requirement that the illicit access be with respect to 
“a facility through which an electronic communication 
service is provided.”87 As pled in the complaint, the illicit 
access at issue was to the plaintiffs’ personal web browsers. 
                                                 
85 Garcia v. City of Laredo, Tex., 702 F.3d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 
2012); see also id. at 793; United States v. Councilman, 418 
F.3d 67, 80-81 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc); S. Rep. No. 99-541, 
at 5 (1986); Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored 
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending 
It, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 1209-15 (2004).   
86 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a); see also id. § 2707(a) (cause of 
action). 
87 In re: Google, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 445-47; 18 U.S.C. § 
2701(a). 
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But according to the District Court, “an individual’s personal 
computing device is not a ‘facility through which an 
electronic communications service is provided.’”88 We agree, 
and we find persuasive the analysis of the Fifth Circuit in 
Garcia v. City of Laredo, which held that “a home computer 
of an end user is not protected by the [Act].”89  
 
 As noted by the Garcia court, though the Act does not 
define the term “facility,” the Act does define the term 
“electronic communication service,” which it defines as “any 
service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or 
receive wire or electronic communications.”90 This most 
naturally describes network service providers, and, indeed, 
“[c]ourts have interpreted the statute to apply to providers of 
a communication service such as telephone companies, 
[i]nternet or e-mail service providers, and bulletin board 
services.”91 The Act also defines “electronic storage” as “(A) 
                                                 
88 In re: Google, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 446.  
89 702 F.3d at 793 (quoting Kerr, A User’s Guide to the 
Stored Communications Act, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 1215). 
90 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (incorporated by reference in 18 
U.S.C. § 2711(1)); see also Garcia, 702 F.3d at 792. 
91 Garcia, 702 F.3d at 792 (citing Councilman, 418 F.3d at 
81-82; Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 
2004); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 
F.3d 457, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1994)); see also In re iPhone, 844 
F. Supp. 2d. at 1057 (“[T]he computer systems of an email 
provider, a bulletin board system, or an [internet service 
provider] are uncontroversial examples of facilities that 
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any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic 
communication incidental to the electronic transmission 
thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an 
electronic communication service for purposes of backup 
protection of such communication.”92 Temporary storage 
incidental to transmission and storage for purposes of backup 
protection are not how personal computing devices keep 
communications, but how third party network service 
providers do—or at least did, in 1986.93  
 There is then the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1), 
which provides that the prohibitory language of the Act “does 
not apply with respect to conduct authorized . . . by the 
person or entity providing a wire or electronic communication 
service.” This makes sense when talking about third-party 
access to network service providers’ own facilities. But were 
the prohibitory language understood to apply to facilities 
other than those of network service providers, the language of 
the exception becomes problematic. As one district court has 
explained, “[i]t would certainly seem odd that the provider of 
a communication service could grant access to one’s home 
                                                                                                             
provide electronic communications services to multiple 
users.”). 
92 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).  
93 See Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications 
Act, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 1213-15 (“The [Act] . . . 
freez[es] into the law the understandings of computer network 
use as of 1986.”) (citing S. Rep. No. 99-541 at 2-3). 
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computer to third parties, but that would be the result of [the 
plaintiffs’] argument.”94  
 
 The origin of the Stored Communications Act 
confirms that Congress crafted the statute to specifically 
protect information held by centralized communication 
providers. “‘Sen. Rep. No. 99–541 (1986)’s entire discussion 
of [the Stored Communications Act] deals only with facilities 
operated by electronic communications services such as 
“electronic bulletin boards” and “computer mail facilit[ies],” 
and the risk that communications temporarily stored in these 
facilities could be accessed by hackers. It makes no mention 
of individual users’ computers . . . .’”95  
 
 The plaintiffs take a different view, arguing that the 
plain language of the terms “facility” and “electronic 
communication service” are sufficiently flexible to 
encompass contemporary personal computing devices that are 
used to engage with telecommunications services. After all, 
when the Act was enacted, Black’s Law Dictionary defined 
“facilities” as “that which promotes the ease of any action, 
operations, transaction, or course of conduct.”96 And the 
                                                 
94 In re: iPhone, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1058 (quoting Crowley v. 
CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d. 1263, 1270-71 (N.D. 
Cal. 2001)).  
95 Garcia, 702 F.3d at 793 (second and third alterations in 
original) (quoting In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 
F. Supp. 2d 497, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting S. Rep. No. 
99–541, at 36). 
96 Black’s Law Dictionary 705 (5th ed. 1979).  
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plaintiffs here use their web browsers to access network 
services such as email and websurfing.  
 
 In considering the plaintiffs’ argument that we should 
give “facility” a broad, plain language meaning, we are 
reminded that “[a] fair reading of legislation demands a fair 
understanding of the legislative plan.”97 And we agree with 
the Fifth Circuit that the Act clearly shows a specific 
congressional intent to deal with the particular problem of 
private communications in network service providers’ 
possession. The textual cues surrounding the term “facility,” 
bolstered by the legislative history and enactment context of 
the Act, support the conclusion that “the words of the statute 
were carefully chosen: ‘[T]he statute envisions a provider (the 
[Internet Service Provider] or other network service provider) 
and a user (the individual with an account with the provider), 
with the user’s communication in the possession of the 
provider.’”98 And “[t]his is consistent with the [Act]’s 
purpose: home computers are already protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, so statutory protections are not needed.”99 In 
this context, “facility” is a term of art denoting where network 
service providers store private communications.  
 
                                                 
97 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015). 
98 Garcia, 702 F.3d at 793 (emphases removed) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored 
Communications Act, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 1215 n.47).  
99 Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, 
72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 1215. 
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 Other Courts of Appeals have understood the Act in a 
similar manner. In In re: Zynga Privacy Litigation, the Ninth 
Circuit explained that the Act “covers access to electronic 
information stored in third party computers.”100 So, too, the 
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Steiger, which held that 
“the [Stored Communications Act] clearly applies, for 
example, to information stored with a phone company, 
Internet Service Provider (ISP), or electronic bulletin board 
system,” but that the Act “does not appear to apply to the 
[government’s] source’s hacking into [the plaintiff’s 
personal] computer . . . because there is no evidence that [the] 
computer maintained any ‘electronic communication 
service[.]’”101 The plaintiffs point to various district court 
decisions that have accepted that personal computers can be 
protected “facilities” under the Stored Communications 
Act.102 However, as another district court observes, these 
decisions “provide little analysis on this point of law, instead 
                                                 
100 750 F.3d at 1104 (emphasis added).  
101 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003). In Steiger, the 
Eleventh Circuit noted that “reading . . . the Wiretap Act to 
cover only real-time interception of electronic 
communications, together with the apparent non-applicability 
of the [Stored Communications] Act to hacking into personal 
computers to retrieve information stored therein, reveals a 
legislative hiatus in the current laws purporting to protect 
privacy in electronic communications.” Id. 
102 E.g., Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 
1125 (W.D. Wash. 2012) Expert Janitorial, LLC v. Williams, 
2010 WL 908740, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. 2010); Chance v. Ave. A, 
Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1161 (W.D. Wash. 2001).  
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assuming [the plaintiffs’] position to be true due to lack of 
argument and then ultimately ruling on other grounds.”103 
The plaintiffs point to no decision of any Court of Appeals 
holding that a personal computing device is protected by the 
Stored Communications Act. 
 
 In sum, the defendants’ alleged conduct implicates no 
protected “facility.” The District Court’s dismissal of the 
claim for violation of the Act will therefore be affirmed.  
 
 
 C. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
 
 The plaintiffs’ final federal claim is for violation of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030. The Act 
creates a cause of action for persons “who suffer[] damage or 
loss” because, inter alia, a third party “intentionally accesses a 
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, 
and thereby obtains . . . information from any protected 
computer.”104  
 
 The District Court dismissed this claim for failing to 
meet the statutory requirement of “damage or loss.”105 Under 
the Act, “the term ‘damage’ means any impairment to the 
integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or 
                                                 
103 In re iPhone, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1057-58. 
104 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), (g). 
105 In re Google, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 448. 
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information.”106  Meanwhile, “the term ‘loss’ means any 
reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of 
responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, 
and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its 
condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost 
incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of 
interruption of service.”107 
 
 On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that they have 
properly pled “loss” under the statute because they have 
alleged that their “impermissibly seized [p]ersonally 
[i]dentifiable [i]nformation is both ‘currency’ and a 
marketable ‘commodity.’”108 By capturing and making 
economic use of such information, the plaintiffs say, the 
defendants have taken the value of such information for 
themselves, depriving the plaintiffs of their own ability to sell 
their internet usage information. Insofar as the plaintiffs have 
a right to capture that value for themselves, the plaintiffs 
contend that the defendants’ conduct has caused them harm.  
 
 The complaint plausibly alleges a market for internet 
history information such as that compiled by the defendants. 
Further, the defendants’ alleged practices make sense only if 
that information, tracked and associated, had value. However, 
when it comes to showing “loss,” the plaintiffs’ argument 
lacks traction. They allege no facts suggesting that they ever 
                                                 
106 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8). 
107 Id. § 1030(e)(11). 
108 Appellants’ Br. 45.  
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participated or intended to participate in the market they 
identify, or that the defendants prevented them from 
capturing the full value of their internet usage information for 
themselves. For example, they do not allege that they sought 
to monetize information about their internet usage, nor that 
they ever stored their information with a future sale in mind. 
Moreover, the plaintiffs do not allege that they incurred costs, 
lost opportunities to sell, or lost the value of their data as a 
result of their data having been collected by others. To 
connect their allegations to the statutory “loss” requirement, 
the plaintiffs’ briefing emphasizes that lost revenue may 
constitute “loss” as that term is defined in the Act.109 This is 
inapposite, however, in that the plaintiffs had no revenue.  
 We see no “damage” or “loss” in the pleadings. We 
will therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the 
claim for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 
 
IV. State Law Claims Against Google 
 
 We now turn to the five California state law claims 
brought against Google only.  
 
 A.  Freestanding Privacy Claims 
 
 We first consider, in tandem, the plaintiffs’ 
freestanding privacy claims under the California 
Constitution110 and California tort law.  
                                                 
109 Id. at 43-45. 
110 Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution states: 
“All people are by nature free and independent and have 
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending 
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 “A privacy violation based on the common law tort of 
intrusion has two elements.”111 “First, the defendant must 
intentionally intrude into a place, conversation, or matter as to 
which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”112 This means “the defendant must have ‘penetrated 
some zone of physical or sensory privacy . . . or obtained 
unwanted access to data’ by electronic or other covert means, 
in violation of the law or social norms.”113 Second, “the 
intrusion must occur in a manner highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.”114  
 
 “The right to privacy in the California Constitution 
sets standards similar to the common law tort of intrusion.”115 
“First, [the plaintiff] must possess a legally protected privacy 
interest. . . . Second, the plaintiff’s expectations of privacy 
must be reasonable. . . . Third, the plaintiff must show that the 
                                                                                                             
life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting 
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and 
privacy.” 
111 Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1072 (Cal. 
2009). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. (quoting Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 
469, 490 (Cal. 1998)).  
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1073. 
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intrusion is so serious ‘in nature, scope, and actual or 
potential impact as to constitute an egregious breach of the 
social norms.’”116 
 
 When presented with parallel privacy claims under tort 
law and the California Constitution, the California Supreme 
Court has performed a dual inquiry “under the rubric of both . 
. . tests.”117 This “consider[s] (1) the nature of any intrusion 
upon reasonable expectations of privacy, and (2) the 
offensiveness or seriousness of the intrusion, including any 
justification and other relevant interests.”118 In evaluating the 
offensiveness of an invasion, the court is to consider 
“pragmatic policy concerns” such that “no cause of action 
will lie for accidental, misguided, or excusable acts of 
overstepping upon legitimate privacy rights.”119 
 
 In dismissing the freestanding privacy claims, the 
District Court concluded that Google’s alleged practices “did 
not rise to the level of a serious invasion of privacy or an 
egregious breach of social norms.”120 Contending the District 
                                                 
116 Id. (quoting Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn., 865 
P.2d 633, 655 (Cal. 1994)). 
117 Id. at 1073-74. 
118 Id. at 1074. 
119 Id. at 1079; Hill, 865 P.2d at 675 (“Whether [a] plaintiff 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances 
and whether [a] defendant’s conduct constitutes a serious 
invasion of privacy are mixed questions of law and fact.”). 
120 In re Google, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 449. 
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Court got it right, Google says the plaintiffs voluntarily sent 
Google all the internet usage information at issue.121 
Moreover, Google argues, tracking cookies are routine.122 
Pointing to cases describing cookies as, more or less, 
innocuous,123 Google offers that courts “routinely” find no 
actionable privacy invasion in cases involving tracking, 
collation, and disclosure of internet usage information.124 
Google gives particular attention to Low v. LinkedIn, where 
the Northern District of California explained that “[e]ven 
disclosure of personal information, including social security 
numbers, does not constitute an ‘egregious breach of the 
social norms’ to establish an invasion of privacy claim.”125 
  
 For purposes of California privacy law, Google’s 
emphasis on tracking and disclosure amounts to a 
smokescreen. What is notable about this case is how Google 
accomplished its tracking. Allegedly, this was by overriding 
the plaintiffs’ cookie blockers, while concurrently 
announcing in its Privacy Policy that internet users could 
                                                 
121 Google Br. at 59 (emphasis in original). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 61 (citing, e.g., Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 14 
(“Cookies are widely used on the internet by reputable 
websites to promote convenience and customization.”)). 
124 Id. at 62 (citing Stern v. Weinstein, 512 Fed. App’x 701, 
702 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
125 Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1025 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012).  
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“reset your browser to refuse all cookies.”126 Google further 
assured Safari users specifically that their cookie blockers 
meant that using Google’s in-house prophylactic would be 
extraneous. Characterized by deceit and disregard, the alleged 
conduct raises different issues than tracking or disclosure 
alone.127  
 Directly pertinent to whether Google’s alleged 
practices implicated a protected privacy interest, California 
tort law treats as actionable an “unwanted access to data by 
electronic or other covert means, in violation of the law or 
social norms.”128 Moreover, the California Constitution 
protects an interest in “conducting personal activities without 
observation,” with the reasonableness of any given 
expectation “rest[ing] on an examination of customs . . . as 
well as the opportunity to be notified in advance and consent 
to the intrusion.”129 To Google’s point, a sophisticated 
                                                 
126 Compl. ¶ 80. 
127 See Kristen Lovin, SafariGate: Benign Behavior or 
Malignant Breach?, Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. (Feb. 22, 
2012), http://stlr.org/2012/02/22/safarigate-benign-behavior-
or-malignant-breach/ (“[O]ne could say that Google ignored 
the express desires of its users, elevating its own commercial 
interests over the user’s personal privacy interests. This kind 
of disregard may be particularly troubling given the relative 
bargaining power that an individual consumer has against a 
monolith like Google.”). 
128 Hernandez, 211 P.3d at 1072 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
129 Id. at 1073 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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internet user may well have known that, in browsing the 
internet, her URL information was sent to Google. But such a 
user would also reasonably expect that her activated cookie 
blocker meant her URL queries would not be associated with 
each other due to cookies.130 As the activated cookie blocker 
equates, in our view, to an express, clearly communicated 
denial of consent for installation of cookies, we find Google 
“intru[ded] upon reasonable expectations of privacy.”131  
 
As for whether the alleged conduct is “so serious in 
nature[] [and] scope . . . as to constitute an egregious breach 
of the social norms,”132 Google not only contravened the 
cookie blockers—it held itself out as respecting the cookie 
blockers. Whether or not data-based targeting is the internet’s 
pole star, users are entitled to deny consent, and they are 
entitled to rely on the public promises of the companies they 
deal with. Furthermore, Google’s alleged conduct was broad, 
touching untold millions of internet users; it was 
surreptitious, surfacing only because of the independent 
                                                 
130 It is no matter whether or not a given plaintiff had actual, 
subjective knowledge of her browser settings and the impact 
of those settings on the defendants’ tracking practices. Like a 
principal’s agent, a personal computing device acts as an 
extension of oneself for purposes of engaging with the 
internet. The decision to use one or another technology is the 
decision to choose its features, even if the lay user may not 
actually know what all those features are in their specifics. 
131 Hernandez, 211 P.3d at 1074. 
132 Id. at 1073 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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research of Mayer and the Wall Street Journal; and it was of 
indefinite duration, with Google’s counsel conceding at 
argument that their tracking cookies have no natural lifespan. 
Particularly as concerns Google’s public statements regarding 
the Safari cookie blocker, we see no justification. Neither, 
apparently, do the elected branches, as California and federal 
executive agencies have themselves sought to penalize 
Google for the events alleged in the complaint.133 Based on 
the pled facts, a reasonable factfinder could indeed deem 
Google’s conduct “highly offensive” or “an egregious breach 
of social norms.”134  
A reasonable jury could conclude that Google’s 
alleged practices constitute the serious invasion of privacy 
contemplated by California law. We will vacate the dismissal 
of the plaintiffs’ claims under the California Constitution and 
California tort law.  
 
 B. California Invasion of Privacy Act 
 
 We next consider the plaintiffs’ claim against Google 
for violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. 
Penal Code § 631(a). Like the federal Wiretap Act, § 631(a) 
“broadly prohibits the interception of wire communications 
and disclosure of the contents of such intercepted 
communications.”135 The California Supreme Court has 
                                                 
133 Compl. ¶¶ 166-68; infra n. 12. 
134 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
135 Tavernetti v. Superior Court, 583 P.2d 737, 739 (Cal. 
1978). 
 57 
explained that “Section 631 was aimed at one aspect of the 
privacy problem—eavesdropping, or the secret monitoring of 
conversations by third parties.”136 
 
 The District Court dismissed the § 631(a) claim for the 
same reasons that it dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal 
wiretapping claim. As discussed above, the pleadings 
demonstrate that Google was itself a party to all the electronic 
transmissions that are the bases of the plaintiffs’ wiretapping 
claims.137 Because § 631 is aimed only at “eavesdropping, or 
the secret monitoring of conversations by third parties,”138 we 
will affirm the dismissal of the California Invasion of Privacy 
Act claim for the same reasons we affirm the dismissal of the 
federal Wiretap Act claim. 
                                                 
136 Ribas v. Clark, 696 P.2d 637, 640 (Cal. 1985); see also 
Powell v. Union Pac. R. Co., 864 F. Supp. 2d 949, 955 (E.D. 
Cal. 2012) (“Section 631 broadly proscribes third party 
access to ongoing communications.”); Thomasson v. GC 
Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 321 Fed. App’x 557, 559 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“California courts interpret ‘eavesdrop,’ as used in § 632, to 
refer to a third party secretly listening to a conversation 
between two other parties.”). 
137 Judge Fisher believes that under Ribas, 696 P.2d 637, 
Google may be liable under Section 631(a) for recording the 
communications and sharing them with third parties. Judge 
Fisher does not write separately as it does not appear that 
California law is developed sufficiently on this question to 
reverse the judgment of the District Court. 
138 Ribas, 696 P.2d at 640. 
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 C. Remaining State Law Claims  
 
 We will affirm the District Court’s dismissals of the 
remaining state law claims against Google.  
 
 The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim 
under the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & 
Prof. Code § 17200, on the basis that, under the statute, 
“private standing is limited to any ‘person who . . . has lost 
money or property’ as a result of unfair competition.”139 
Likewise, the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim 
under the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access 
and Fraud Act, Cal. Penal Code § 502, on the basis of § 502’s 
requirement that a suit may only be brought by one who has 
“suffer[ed] damage or loss by reason of a violation.”140 As 
discussed above in connection with the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, the complaint fails to show damage or actual loss. 
Accordingly, the dismissal of these claims was proper. 
 
The California Consumers Legal Remedies Act,  Cal. 
Civ. Code § 1770, proscribes various “unfair methods of 
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result 
or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to 
any consumer.”141 On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that they 
                                                 
139 Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 884 (Cal. 
2011) (quoting § 17204).  
140 Cal. Penal Code § 502(e). 
141 Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a). 
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plead a forced “sale” whereby they gave their trackable 
internet history information in exchange for advertisements 
delivered to their browsers (i.e., the “services”). The plaintiffs 
present no caselaw in support of their expansive construction 
of “sale.” And California federal courts have expressly 
rejected defining “sale” as to include “transactions” based on 
non-tangible forms of payment, including internet usage 
information specifically.142 Likewise, Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines a sale as a “transfer or property or title for a price,” 
requiring specifically “a price in money paid or promised.”143 
We follow the view of the California federal courts, and see 
no “sale . . . of services” in the allegations of the complaint. 




 In light of the foregoing, we will dispose of the 
plaintiffs’ claims in the following manner.  
 
 We will affirm the dismissal of the three federal law 
claims brought against all defendants. Because the defendants 
were parties to all electronic transmissions at issue in this 
                                                 
142 See Claridge v. RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 864 
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s contention that “his 
transfer of . . . information to defendant in exchange for free 
applications[] constitutes a ‘purchase’ or ‘lease’” as finding 
“no support under the specific statutory language of the 
[Act]”); Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., 2013 WL 1282980, 
at *12 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (same). 
143 Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“Sale”). 
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case, and plaintiffs state no Wiretap Act violation per 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). The alleged intrusion upon the 
plaintiffs’ personal computing devices does not implicate a 
“facility” protected by the Stored Communications Act. And 
the plaintiffs plead no cognizable losses as required by the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 
 
 We will vacate the District Court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ freestanding privacy claims against Google under 
the California Constitution and California tort law. A 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the means by which 
defendants allegedly accomplished their tracking, i.e., by way 
of a deceitful override of the plaintiffs’ cookie blockers, 
marks the serious invasion of privacy contemplated by 
California law. But we will affirm the dismissal of the 
remainder of the plaintiffs’ state law claims. The plaintiffs fail 
to plead a violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act 
for the same reason that they fail to plead a violation of the 
federal Wiretap Act. Likewise, because they do not show 
loss, the plaintiffs fail to show violations of the California 
Unfair Competition Law or the California Comprehensive 
Computer Data Access and Fraud Act. Finally, the plaintiffs 
do not plead a “sale” as required by the California Consumers 
Legal Remedies Act. 
